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 Agency: The Internal Split of Structure
 Yong Wang1
 In this article I first examine the ways in which the dual terms of structure and agency are used
 in sociological theories. Then, relying on Lacan s notions of split-subject, the formula of sexua
 tion, and forms of discourses, and Laclaus theory of ideological hegemony, I argue that agency
 in most current sociological formulations is but a posited other of the structure that dissolves if
 examined closely; it is similar to the Lacanian fantasmic object. To resolve the fundamental
 paradoxes in s truc ture-agency theories, I reformulate structures as paradoxical, incomplete, and
 contingent symbolic formations that are always partial and unstable due to their inclusion and
 exclusion operations. Consequently, social transformational agency consists in the structural
 inconsistencies that open structural gaps available to social actors. As a result, agency can be
 recognized in two moments conceived as two symbolic gestures. From this perspective, agency
 as such is always a possibility qua potential and its efficacy is always retroactively recognized
 actualized from within a new social structure or symbolic order.
 KEY WORDS: actor; agency; structure; structure-agency theories.
 INTRODUCTION
 The abundant literature on structure-agency theories2 not only attests
 to its indisputable influence but also bears witness to the rising discontents
 about the existing formulation of the core concepts: structure and agency.
 As Meyer and Jepperson indicate, "there is more abstract metatheory
 about 'actors' and their 'agency' than substantive arguments about the
 topic" (2000:101). Archer's discussion on the upward, downward, and cen
 tral conflations may be the most systematic critique of the dominant theo
 retical strategies with regard to structure and agency (Archer, 2000, 2003).
 Worth quoting here are her comments on what she calls "amalgam
 1 Department of Sociology, Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey 07043;
 e-mail: wangy@mail.montclair.edu.
 2 Here, I refer to structuration theory, theories of practice, and theories that employ the dual
 concepts of structure and agency as their central conceptual tool in general.
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 of practices," which, according to Archer, "oscillates wildly between
 voluntarism and determinism, without being able to specify the conditions
 under which agents have greater degrees of freedom or, conversely, work
 under a considerable stringency of constraints" (Archer, 2000:6). Working
 within the paradigm of systems theory and apparently having no intention
 to salvage the concept of agency, Fuchs probably provides the strongest
 critique of Archer's work. He argues that agency is "a residual, consisting
 of that proportion of variance unaccounted for by social structure.
 Agency is not the cause, but the effect, of failures at prediction" (Fuchs,
 2001:34). Although I find Fuchs's above quoted argument very illuminat
 ing and agree with him with little reservation,3 I nevertheless note that
 failures at prediction or explanation ought not to be the reason to dismiss
 the concept of agency. Therefore, in this article I examine the dual con
 cepts of structure and agency following two intellectual traditions: Lacan's
 formulation of the split-subject and Laclau's theory on ideological hege
 mony, which, respectively, lend new conceptual tools to reformulate, on
 one hand, the possibility of agency as residing outside formations of struc
 ture; and on the other, structures as hegemonic constructions that always
 contain its beyond or exclusion, which renders agency possible.
 Before approaching the specifics of structure and agency, a big pic
 ture is to be drawn: a picture that addresses the fundamental paradoxes of
 structure and agency. One effective way to draw this picture is to engage
 the limits of the conceptual and relational domains of structure and
 agency, the points that serve as gestures of the exclusion of a "beyond."
 Along this line, Pickering's (1993, 2000) conception of material agency,
 for example, points to the beyond of a human-centered conception of
 agency, one that is central to structuration theory and theories of social
 practice.
 Although Pickering's subjectivizing gesture in construing the unknown
 material world as a form of "resistance" is itself problematic (see, e.g.,
 Breslau, 2000; Jones, 1996), it nonetheless raises an important question: Do
 we humans live in a world of our own will? If not, how do we account for
 the material world that is always already part of our reality? What is
 paradoxical in Pickering's strategy is that, in a purely symbolic (human)
 gesture, he tries to erase the difference between human and nonhuman
 agency. If Pickering's strategy is to directly attribute agency to the
 (unknown) material world, Breslau (one of Pickering's strongest critics),
 3 Having originated from two different intellectual traditions, Lacanian perspective and sys
 tems theory established by Niklas Luhmann share some fundamental features, which can
 not be addressed in this article. It suffices to say here that the shared features may very
 well find their origin in their similar starting points: signifier as possibility of knowledge
 and distinctions as observation.
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 opts for structure qua actor-network to address the issue of nonhuman
 agency. According to Breslau, not only the actor-network is "thoroughly
 relational" (Breslau, 2000:300), the human and nonhuman agencies are
 both relationally constituted as well. The price to be paid for a thoroughly
 relational ontological status of the actor-network is the determination of
 the network as such. What act, then, determines the actor-network as such,
 namely, its symbolic (over)determination, its double? The formation of an
 existing actor-network entails a determination of the network as a gesture
 of exclusion through positing a beyond that is nonrelational. For instance,
 a network of CEOs and high-level managers of large corporations would
 only function if it excludes, for instance, low-level employees. Of course,
 this is not to deny that inside the network agency/power is relationally
 constituted. Hence, the paradox is that the determination of a relational
 network is not relational.
 On the side of structure, similar paradoxes are not far away. Take for
 example the central thesis of structuration theory that structure both
 enables and constrains (the actor in her action) (Emirbayer and Mische,
 1998:1003; Giddens, 1984:169; Hays, 1994:61). Questions soon arise: How
 did Nazi concentration camps enable the Jews, or the Soviet gulags enable
 millions of dissidents and innocent citizens? It should be noted emphati
 cally here that concentration camps and their variations are precisely
 power structures that are devised to deprive human beings of their agency.
 This seemingly extreme case points to a fundamental paradox in struc
 ture-agency theories: when the only function of structure is to erase the
 last trace of agency. Even if one resorts to "less extreme" cases, one
 would find similar problems. Take another example: the racist segregation
 ist system of the U.S. South. The segregation system never simply con
 strained and enabled people; it enabled one group but constrained
 another. Therefore, structure is not a neutral force that constrains and
 enables an abstract actor or actors. The argument that structures con
 strain and enable obfuscates the fundamental paradox in the relation
 between structure and agency, the fundamental antagonism resulting from
 structural formations conditioned by exclusion.
 THE ENTANGLEMENT OF STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
 In this section I try to untangle the intricate knots of structure and
 agency with a focus on the presupposed constraints and enablements that
 are considered the fundamental functions of structure. In recent literature
 on theories of structure-agency, one can hardly find the postulate that
 structure is merely a set of constraints or limits. In fact, as early as in
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 1986, Swidler's (1986) metaphor of the cultural "toolkit" had already
 unequivocally suggested the enabling capacity of culture qua structure. Of
 course, the problem with this image is the presupposed actor who is
 already able to select and apply cultural tools to varied situations. One
 na?ve but nonetheless necessary question can be posed here: Is the ability
 to use the tools innate to the actor? If not, one is compelled to ask: Are
 such abilities already some structural effects?4
 Unfortunately, ensuing efforts in theoretical and empirical works on
 structure-agency have not departed from this posited capability qua agency
 as a fundamental trait in the actor. For instance, despite his many trenchant
 insights on structure-agency, Sewell surprisingly makes the point that "a
 capacity for agency?for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting
 creatively?is inherent in all humans.... [T]hat humans are born with only a
 highly generalized capacity for agency, analogous to their capacity to use
 language.... But a capacity for agency is as much a given for humans as the
 capacity for respiration" (Sewell, 1992:20) In light of Zizek's discussion on
 the Hegelian moments of possibility and actuality, which states that actual
 ity is the conjunction of possibility qua potentiality and some externally
 (imposed) forces (Zizek, 1993:141-142), one can immediately recognize that
 in Sewell's proposition half the set is missing. To further illustrate this
 point, I would like to use Zizek's example on the correlation between prole
 tariat revolution and the working class (Zizek, 1993:142) In a Marxist
 framework, the working class is potentially capable of revolution. The only
 problem is that revolution would not automatically happen when all the
 conditions, such as extreme exploitation and stark poverty, are mature.
 (There may be riots.) That is to say, the revolutionary potential of the pro
 letariat cannot be actualized without an external act that recognizes this
 potential and forces the proletariat to act as a revolutionary subject. One
 necessary component imposed externally onto the working class qua revolu
 tionary potential is the Party, which would transform the working class into
 a revolutionary subject, from in-itself to for-itself. Along the same line of
 argument, humans' capability of using language qua actuality is a two-sided
 coin: on one side is some innate capacity for language use; and on the other
 the externally imposed social cultural institutions that socialize humans qua
 potentiality into actual language users. What is crucial with regard to this
 argument is the asymmetry between potentiality and actuality: potentiality
 can be recognized only in its actuality but not vice versa. We should even
 push this argument one step further: the assertion that we all have capacity
 for agency is nothing but a gesture to create an illusion of a primordially
 4 A "yes" answer to the question registers nothing but the failure of explanation. In other
 words, if the ability to employ the cultural toolkit were to be understood as a certain
 innate capacity, what is effectively posited is an inaccessible and impenetrable Thing.
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 leveled ground that never materializes in its actuality; what really exists,
 namely, what is actualized, are our unequal capacities that result from
 social structures of unequal social, economic, political, and cultural means.
 Here, I would like to point out that Sewell's assertion for the existence of
 such capacity has already departed from his arguably most important point
 in the article discussed here, namely: "Agency is implied by the existence of
 structure" (Sewell, 1992:20).
 Another notable theorizing effort on structure-agency is Hays's four
 ways of understanding the notion of agency. Rejecting the structural
 deterministic thesis that agents are "carriers or instruments of social struc
 tures" (Hays, 1994:62) and the voluntaristic conception of agency, Hays
 offers two alternatives.
 Second, one can say that people make structures at the same times as structures
 make people: through everyday practices, the choices made by agents serve to cre
 ate and recreate structures continuously. Third, one can argue that people are
 agents insofar as they make choices that have significant transformational conse
 quences in terms of the nature of social structure themselves. (Hays, 1994:62)
 The first alternative, the second form of agency above, which Hays
 calls structurally reproductive agency, creates more problems than solu
 tions. First, if we accept Hays's explication that structures are repro
 duced "only through the interactional activities of individuals"
 (1994:62), can we also say that structures have always already taken
 into account people's interactional activities as their very mechanism
 for reproduction? The problem with this first alternative is its funda
 mental ambiguity: either interactions imply certain agency on the inter
 actants' side or interactions are always already structural processes and
 effects. The question is: Where does one locate agency? If we opt for
 the former, we claim an innate capacity in the interactant. If one
 locates agency on structure's side, one already loses the human-centered
 notion of agency. If the notion is to be of any explanatory power,
 however, the one gesture to be absolutely avoided is precisely the
 obfuscating argument that agency has to be situated in structural con
 texts. Following Fuchs's argument that the possibility of observing
 agency is often a matter of scale (Fuchs, 2001:25-26); namely, as one
 examines actions or interactions at the (alleged) micro level, one is able
 to attribute agency to the actor as a person with intentions, wants,
 beliefs, and so forth. However, if we take Fuchs's observational strat
 egy one step further to examine the forms of intention, wants, and
 beliefs, one would find agency dissolving again into the social struc
 tural: intentions, wants, beliefs, roles, and identities are already either
 components or effects of the social symbolic order. It is in this sense
 that socially reproductive agency always eludes our grasp: at the very
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 moment we think we have a good hold of it we realize that what is in
 our hands is nothing but some elements of social structures.
 Second, Hays recognizes that with regard to this form of agency,
 choices made by agents are ones "among an available set of structurally
 provided alternatives" (1994:63). If this is true, does the empty gesture of
 making a choice regulated by structures suggest any agency in the choice
 maker? In a contemporary case, we have President Bush's offer of choice
 regarding the War on Terror: you are either with us or against us. Either
 way, one remains in a social reality precisely structured by the two
 choices. Such "actions" of choosing are empty because the choices are
 forced, given only to sustain the appearance of choice. Perhaps the case of
 Willis's (1977) lads, as discussed by Hays (1994:163), is more illuminating
 with regard to structurally reproductive agency, but in a much different
 sense. Willis's lads are a group of working-class schoolboys who refuse to
 conform to disciplinary rules and academic norms in school. Their defi
 ance against the bourgeois ideology of achievement, not surprisingly,
 lands them in the working class. Is this not a perfect example that struc
 tures have already taken into account their own deviation, which is
 already a structural choice? One is tempted to argue that the capitalist
 class structure needs some people, to use Merton's (1957) words, who
 reject cultural goals so that an under or working class is reproduced. The
 defiant gestures of Willis's lads' to distance themselves from the ideology
 of achievement sustain the very system they seemingly reject. To the extent
 that Willis's lads are not aware of the fact that their defiance is the very
 cause of their reproduction as members of the working class, this case
 shows perfectly one form of ideology characterized by Zizek (1991)?
 "They know not what they do." A more complex form of ideology that
 functions to sustain social structure of post-totalitarian system, according
 to Zizek, is "They know, but nevertheless...." (Zizek, 1991:241-245). An
 exemplary case of the second form is Pavel's proverbial greengrocer in
 pre-1989 Prague, who, though indifferent to the totalitarian system, com
 plains in private about the corruption and inefficiency of the bureaucracy,
 nonetheless faithfully performs his duty: hanging out signs saying "Long
 Live Socialism" on state holidays (Zizek, 2001:90). How are we to address
 the issue of agency in this form? The crucial point not to be missed here is
 that the power structure already takes into account such complaints, the
 cynical distance the subject carefully maintains to resist the overwhelming
 sense of guilt. As long as the subject performs his or her duty, the system
 has nothing to worry about.5 It is in this sense that I would argue that in
 5 A perfect example is doubtlessly contemporary Chinese society where a totalitarian system
 is sustained because everyone carefully calculates what one says in public while at the same
 time tries to benefit from the many "choices" available in the economic domain.
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 cases of Willis's lads and the "greengrocer" in post-totalitarian societies,
 agency has to be (re)located in structure, not in the actor, because the
 reproduction of structures effectively relies on the actor's illusion of
 choices in forms of defiance and distancing.
 Despite the above critique, one of Hays's important contributions to
 structure-agency theory is her distinction between socially reproductive
 and socially transformational agencies (Hays, 1994). Hays's second alter
 native, namely, her third form of agency, or socially transformational
 agency, captures the thrust of the notion of agency as something at least
 not completely on the side of structure. That said, some crucial questions
 remain unanswered. First, how is the significance of transformational con
 sequences recognized? Second, correlative to the first question, how is the
 "nature of social structures themselves" (Hays, 1994:62) determined?
 What I try to suggest here is that measuring the significance of transfor
 mational consequences always entails a social symbolic order within which
 the natures of the social structure to be transformed and the new social
 structure are defined. Furthermore, what about failed endeavors to change
 certain social order? Do those actors who participate in failed attempts
 have agency? I will return to these questions in a later section. It suffices
 to say here that to answer these questions, the notion of structure itself
 needs to be reformulated. One of the socially transformational agent's
 main tasks is to (re)define or (re)frame the existing social structure and
 the new social structure the agent strives for. The theorist, as a second
 order observer, to borrow a term from the systems theorist, has to exam
 ine the social symbolic order within which the subject of transformation is
 actualized and agency is recognized.
 AGENCY: THE INTERNAL SPLIT OF STRUCTURE
 If structural constraints and enablements inevitably point to the effi
 cacy of structure at least in the case of socially reproductive agency, one is
 tempted to perform a pseudo-mathematical operation: subtraction. The
 question then is: When one takes away structural constraints and enable
 ments, what is left of the actor or agent? The answer is not as obvious as
 it might appear. In fact, one can reasonably argue that this is the very
 moment from which social theorists move apart from one another. For
 instance, Giddens has to assert the duality of structure and to subsume
 both structure and agency under the notion of structuration to heal the
 cut that creates the dual terms. Archer, who obviously is against such
 "central conflation," nonetheless constructs a narrative trying to unify
 structure and agency in temporality, which would allow what she calls
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 analytical dualism. In Archer's scheme, agency only returns as the present
 "I" "as a source of creativity and innovation" (Archer, 2003:73). Emirba
 yer and Mische's direct treatment of "What is agency?" is in a sense not
 fundamentally different from Archer's.6 The real problem is not that after
 taking away structural constraints and enablements, nothing is left. There
 is indeed something left: the leftover. The real task is how to formulate
 this leftover. From the Lacanian perspective, this leftover is both an effect
 produced by the very notion of structure and the limits that formations of
 structures stumble upon and fail. In the Lacanian framework, this leftover
 is called objet petit a?the small object of a. The being of this object of a
 can be located in the Imaginary, which is the product of signification; or
 in the Real, indicating the failure of symbolic integration.
 The Lacanian universe has three registers: the real, the symbolic, and
 the imaginary. The Lacanian real, according to Zizek (1989:162), has two
 sides: "the brute and pre-symbolic reality which always returns to its
 place," and the (presupposed) cause of a series of structural effects. In
 other words, the Lacanian real is a paradox. Zizek most clearly renders
 the two paradoxical sides of the real: "[T]he real designates a substantial
 hard kernel that precedes and resists symbolization and, simultaneously, it
 designates the left-over, which is posited or 'produced' by symbolization
 itself" (Zizek, 1993:36). The paradox is, put somewhat simplistically, that
 the real is a remainder and a surplus at the same time. Figure 1, which is
 also Lacan's formulation of the master's discourse (Lacan, 2007:29-32),
 may further explicate the paradox.
 In Fig. 1, the symbolic is presented as a chain of signifiers: Si?S2.
 Si stands for the master or master signifier that totalizes the field of
 knowledge, S2 is a set of signifiers that only achieve stable meanings
 through Si. A convenient exemplary case is Giddens's notion of structure
 as rules and resources. Here, the signifier "structure" functions precisely
 as the master signifier that integrates and regulates the infinite interplay of
 rules and resources. If one stays at the upper level of the figure, one only
 sees a purely symbolic field, what one would call the (social) reality. What
 is hidden underneath is the Lacanian subject that is the very split between
 master's signifier, a dominant social identity forced on a person, for
 instance, and the leftover or surplus of her/his identification. This leftover
 surplus is what Lacan calls the objet petit a, or the small object of a. Such
 a peculiar name indicates that this object cannot be recognized in any
 positivity. Instead, it is an object sustained only through the split-subject's
 6 Here, we witness two strategies to maintain discursive consistency: Giddens's atemporal
 duality of structure and agency that eventually leads to temporal process of structuration;
 and Archer's and, arguably, Emirbayer and Mische's narratives of a temporal space pro
 posed to resolve the paradox in the atemporal presuppositions.
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 Si ?????? S;2
 ? a
 Fig. 1. Lacan's master's discourse.
 fantasy. To further illustrate the notions of the split-subject and the object
 of a, let us do one little exercise: making a list of all social identities, roles,
 statuses, and relations that one thinks may define oneself. Our feeling is
 that no matter how long this list stretches, there is always something left
 to be enumerated. In other words, I am always more than my symbolic
 identities, roles, and so forth, and there is some hard kernel in e that
 always resists symbolization. This hard kernel is the small object of a. The
 Lacanian subject is precisely the very split between one's symbolic identifi
 cation and the fantasmic object-remainder. Different from the notion of
 subject conceived as autonomous and the deconstructionist's reduction of
 the subject to structural subjective positions, the Lacanian subject is a gap
 between the symbolic and a fantasmic object. Zizek further warns us that
 the object-remainder is not to be understood as a positive Thing; it is an
 effect of our being involved in a symbolic order. This is why it is often
 perceived as already lost. To further explicate this notion of split subject
 or, more accurately, the split as the subject, let us think of the notion of
 "closet." From the viewpoint of the normative heterosexual social order,
 the signifier of closet signifies its very limit, a void that serves as the
 beyond of the social order. For those gay en and lesbians who remain
 in the closet and at the same time live "normal" lives regulated by the
 normative heterosexual order, this void is precisely the split, the gap one
 occupies, the place from which one could claim: I am more than what you
 (the normative social symbolic order) say I am. Only when such void or
 the beyond in relation to a certain social order is able to not only claim
 its presence but also signifying such presence as a kind of universal, can a
 new social order emerge.
 Purely structural explanations, which exclude the notion of subject or
 include the notion of subject as a sense of self correlative to social identi
 ties, and roles, remain on the upper level of the Lacanian master's dis
 course. They have to be compensated by bringing in a Thing that conceals
 the lack in formations of structures. This fantasmic Thing is called agency.
 This is how the Lacanian perspective leads to an argument similar to
 that of systems theorists such as Fuchs (2001). Different from the systems
 theorists, however, the Lacanians do not conceive agency as merely an
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 indicator of the failure of a certain system's observation. Instead, the split
 subject renders it possible to conceive of agency in a different manner.
 Along the dimension of the Lacanian real, agency in most current theories
 of structuration and practice returns as an object (of a) to the structural
 holes precisely at the moment of the failure of structural explanations. This
 point has been, if not explicitly stated, strongly suggested in some sociolo
 gists' works. For instance, Ryan's pithy analysis of the Nicaraguan Revolu
 tion (Ryan, 2000) introduces the revolutionary agents precisely at the
 points where the purely structural explanations fail. He perspicaciously rec
 ognizes the gap between structural conditions and the actual social events.
 In other words (if we can elaborate Ryan's points further at the risk of
 reading too much into his argument), the gap between structural conditions
 and actual social-revolutionary events is abysmal. There is no enumerative
 strategy that would bridge this gap. Put simply, in examining social trans
 formations, the list of structural conditions concerning the pr?state would
 never sufficiently fill in the gap between the pre- and the poststate formed
 by the researcher. Formations of social, cultural, economic, and political
 conditions always stumble on the Real that is the beyond of such social
 realities posited as structural conditions. It is strictly in this sense that
 agency as real always returns to such structural gaps.
 How, then, should we understand the thesis that agency is at the
 same time a fantasmic (imagined) Thing? One way to approach this issue
 is to get closer to what is supposed to be agency to the point where it dis
 solves. One of the best places to perform such an operation is the domain
 of social psychology. Take, for example, Tsushima and Burke's (1999)
 work on levels of the parent identity and how the women they studied
 exhibit different types of (lack of) agency because of such internally strati
 fied identities: principle-oriented mothers exhibit more agency than their
 counterparts, the program-oriented mothers. Closely examined, one can
 not help wondering: Are not the principles, values, and norms already
 parts in an ideological symbolic order, and their internalization already
 products of socioeconomic circumstances?their own upbringings, for
 instance, which Tsushima and Burke recognize in their conclusion? Again,
 with a similar operation of subtraction performed on such agency?taking
 away the identities, principles, and values as effects of socialization, what
 is left is a void, the name of actor without any substance. Agency thus
 dissolves immediately once we take away the notion of parent as an
 identity (and its derivatives such as values and principles, or lack thereof)
 from parenting. Identification with an identity and acting accordingly (in
 accordance with the values, principles, rules, abilities, resources, etc.) only
 bears witness to the efficacy of the structure signified through the master
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 signifier, for example, the identity of parent and its supporting ideological
 system.
 In this sense, the formation of structure and agency is homologous
 to Lacan's formula of sexuation (Lacan, 1998:78-89). In this two-sided
 formula, two paradoxical logics are proposed. On the masculine side, the
 universal function (the phallic function) to which all Xs are submitted
 implies an exception: there is at least one X that is not submitted to the
 function. Without elaborating on Lacan's notions of the masculine and
 feminine, we can simply point out that what Lacan aims at with regard to
 the masculine logic is that any universal function such as the concept of
 structure in sociological theories implies a constitutive exception, namely,
 the positing act that establishes such universal functions. In other words,
 we implicitly accept our structural explanations as universal, as the totality
 of the social, while ignoring the very positing of such totalities. It is in this
 sense that structure is on the side of the masculine. Agency, which is het
 erogeneous to structure, is on the feminine side, whose logic states that
 there is no X that is not submitted to the universal function, but that not
 all Xs are submitted to it. This seemingly paradoxical "formula" points
 precisely to the ways the notion of agency is treated in sociological theory:
 every conceivable form of agency is intricately intertwined with the notion
 of structure, nonetheless one cannot conclude that all agency is structural.
 Put it in psychoanalytical terms, agency is the symptom of structure:
 agency cannot achieve its identity with itself, and for structure to achieve
 its identity, it has to invent agency to conceal its own gaps (see Zizek,
 1990:253 for an analogous discussion on man and woman).
 If agency only achieves its identity through structure, then a direct
 treatment of agency would inevitably fall back onto some structural for
 mation or tautological rendition such as Emirbayer and Mische's triadic
 agency (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Take, for instance, Emirbayer and
 Mische's definition of agency: the temporally constructed engagement by
 actors of different structural environments?the temporal-relational contexts
 of action?which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment,
 both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive responses
 to the problems posed by changing historical situations (Emirbayer and
 Mische, 1998:970). One question needs to be asked before anyone applies
 such a definition to research: Are "structural environments" conceivable
 without actors? If the answer is yes, then the actors are dispensable or
 replaceable, and structures can effectively reproduce themselves. There is
 no reason why one should attribute agency to the actors instead of the
 structure. If the answer is no, then the actors are already part of the struc
 tural environments. The challenge is how to distinguish agency from its
 structural environment. Soon, one will find agency to be nothing but an
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 relational and temporal position with an attributed capacity, a purely
 structural effect.
 As soon as one tries to conceive agency as independent from any
 structural or symbolic order (or pattern), one finds that agency becomes
 the very gap between itself and the structure, as if an unknown cause of
 itself has to be posited. Archer correctly points out the mistakes in the
 upward and downward conflations: to treat either structure or agency as
 epiphenomenon. But to avoid conflation of either type, that is, to find a
 third way out, often leads to pseudo-dialectical notions such as structur
 ation or practice. Following Zizek's discussion on dialectics (Zizek,
 1993:122-124), we should argue that an authentic dialectical gesture here
 is not to synthesize the two notions as, for instance, two moments of cer
 tain process such as structuration or practice but, rather, to recognize the
 very gap between the two and to assert that the very gap is constitutive of
 structure. In other words, the very gap between the notion of structure
 and agency is the inner split of structure, and agency is from the begin
 ning structure's posited other and it embodies the possibility and impossi
 bility of structure. That is to say, on one hand, agency is the horizon of
 structure, the limit that always escapes the grip of structure yet internally
 conceived in structure. On the other hand, the very impossibility to be
 captured by structure is what sustains the very notion of structure as its
 boundary. It is in this sense that we can return to Sewell's argument that
 "[a]gency is implied by the existence of structure" (Sewell, 1992:20).
 STRUCTURE, HEGEMONY, AND SYMBOLIC ORDER
 The above argument, that agency is but an effect of the internal split
 of structure, ought to be understood neither as an ultimate totality of
 structure (structural determinism) nor as a need to synthesize the dual
 concepts (asserting duality or dualism). To reformulate the concepts of
 structure and agency, two theses need to be proposed here. The first is the
 Lacanian conception of subject as the very split between a (social) sym
 bolic order and a fantasmic object that is the very void-exclusion-surplus
 of the symbolic order. What needs to be affirmed with regard to this point
 is that this object is a paradoxical one, which never appears in positivity.
 Furthermore, this split-subject is not yet agency but a condition of agency.
 In other words, it opens the possibility of agency. The second thesis con
 cerns directly with reformulating the notion of structure: structural forma
 tions are never complete because they always entail operations of
 exclusion posited as a beyond. In this section, I try to explicate this argu
 ment and address the theoretical consequences of this thesis.
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 Wrong's nearly half-century old critique of the o ver socialized concep
 tion of man (Wrong, 1961) points in a direction that is still important
 today. In his frequently cited article, Wrong proposes a thesis originated
 with Freud: "man is a social animal without being entirely a socialized
 animal" (1961:192). In other words, the socialization process is never com
 plete and there is always a leftover that resists socialization. Although one
 can immediately recognize that such a remainder is but a myth, the signifi
 cance of Wrong's proposal lies elsewhere. As a theoretical gesture, what
 Wrong effectively rejects is the conception of human beings as (social)
 automata. Our attention, however, should not turn to the supposed unso
 cialized remainder because it would be wrong to refer to any positive ani
 malistic traits humans manifest as evidence of such leftovers of
 socialization. In so doing we will soon find those animalistic traits only
 too human. The real task for the social theorist is to distinguish humans
 from social automaton. This distinction lies precisely in the very gesture
 of asserting herself/himself as human in addition to all the roles, identi
 ties, and relations. Humans are social animals who not only refer to them
 selves, as the symbolic interactionist would argue (Blumer, 1968), but refer
 to their referring. It should be noted that what is suggested here is neither
 some negative position one is able to take in relation to certain social
 identities, roles, and relations nor a kind of humanist assertion of some
 inborn human essence; instead, the very act of recognizing one's social
 identities and roles and at the same time asserting that one is more than
 the social is the very proof of one's humanness. This is the Lacanian split
 subject (S) that, on one hand, is displaced/decentered onto the symbolic
 Other, and on the other, occupies the very gap/split as its "being." What
 is needed with regard to structure is a similar reformulation, that is, to
 assert Lacan's logic of sexuation on the feminine side: although every for
 mulation of social phenomena is structural, all of the social field is not
 structural. This does not mean that there are things in the presymbolic
 social field that cannot be incorporated into structural formation; instead,
 it means that, on one hand, no structural formation is able to grasp the
 totality of the social, and on the other, the irreconcilable gaps among vari
 ous structural formations bear witness to the Non-All of these formations,
 and the possibility of shifting from one formation to another points to a
 certain fundamental antagonism (the Lacanian real) that resists symbolic
 incorporation (Zizek, 2006:25-26, 253). This is also what Laclau means
 with the statement that society as such is impossible (Laclau, 1990).
 Therefore, as a first step we should unequivocally reject the notion
 that structure is something that really exists independent of any significa
 tion. Such structures are already posited as the beyond or limits of a cer
 tain system of signification. Any such assertion merely indicates the
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 inability to signify them. Thus it should be emphatically stated that social
 (cultural, political, economic, etc.) structures are always signified struc
 tures, albeit mis-signified structures. It should be noted that the notion of
 mis-signification is not to be understood as false consciousness. The idea
 of false consciousness is not sustainable without some conception of real
 reality (Laclau, 1990). In his effort to reformulate the notion of the ideo
 logical, Laclau asserts that "[t]he ideological would not consist of the mis
 recognition of a positive essence, but exactly opposite: it would consists of
 the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the
 impossibility of any ultimate suture" (Laclau, 1990:92, emphasis added).
 What Laclau's definition of the ideological entails is a sociopolitical field
 that competing social discourses endeavor to hegemonize. The ideological
 is thus the discursive gesture that claims not being ideological. This leads
 to the second point: structure is to be understood as discursive or sym
 bolic formation of the social field that is defined by the symbolic forma
 tion through inclusion and exclusion. The self-referentiality?a symbolic
 formation defines its own object?captures precisely the fundamental par
 adox that is constitutive of the social field.
 One of the most important Lacanian tenets concerning discourse qua
 instantiation of the symbolic order is that the infinite sliding of a discur
 sive field is only (temporarily) stabilized or totalized through what is
 known as quilting points, point de capiton (Lacan, 2006:681). Conse
 quently, in order to conceive a system in its totality, there needs to be at
 least one signifier that refers to the system itself. The self-referentiality of
 such a signifier immediately produces a paradox: on one hand, the signi
 fier that refers to the totality of the system indicates precisely a beyond of
 it?the excluded that would subvert the system if included. On the other
 hand, the beyond (or limit) of the totality of a system signifies the failure
 of the signifying act, namely, the very impossibility of signifying the
 beyond. Thus the reference to a beyond is the only condition to conceive
 a system in its totality. Then, the fundamental paradox of a totalized sys
 tem is that the failure of totalizing serves as the very condition of the pos
 sibility of a totality7 (Laclau, 1996:37-40). One of the best examples is
 functionalist theory, which in resolving the problem concerning dysfunc
 tions, a typical solution is to conceive dysfunction as serving certain func
 tions in society. Here, Laclau's formulation on social totalization helps us
 7 I should admit here that this paragraph is a(n) (over)simplified representation of Laclau's
 wonderful discussion on empty signifier and hegemonic formation. Within the limit of
 space here I cannot possibly provide a more elaborate summary. Moreover, Laclau's for
 mulation of paradox parallels that of Luhmann's, suggesting a likely relation between
 semiotics and systems theory.
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 recognize how functionalist theory inscribes its own excluded beyond as
 an internal difference in a paradoxical manner.
 Thus, the second important step in reformulating the notion of
 structure is to recognize that social structures, as social symbolic forma
 tions, are always contingent on acts of positing master signifiers and
 are always dislocated in the sense that their meaningfulness and efficacy
 depend on an excluded (and disavowed) beyond that serves as the
 ground. Put differently, a symbolic social formation entails a relation
 "by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent com
 munitarian fullness" (Laclau, 1996:43). For instance, systemic function
 in functionalist theories stands for the absent fullness of Society. This
 relation between the particular and universal is what Laclau has termed
 as hegemony. Here, the signifier of the capitalized "Society" signifies
 the impossibility of conceiving the social in its totality, which Laclau
 calls an empty signifier (Laclau, 1996:36-40). Functionalist theories are
 endeavors to hegemonize the social field as universal through particular
 contents of system-functions. What needs to be clarified immediately at
 this point is that such hegemony is necessary and its encounter with its
 own paradox, for instance, the function of dysfunction, is inevitable.
 Another example is action theory itself in an imagined scenario I would
 call "when the action theorist meets Mertonian retreatist" (Merton,
 1957:153). Our reluctance to recognize action in what the Mertonian
 homeless loiterer does?subsisting in whatever he can get licitly or illic
 itly, attests to the inherent paradox of action theory. Agamben's Homo
 Sacer, people who are deprived of any identities and legal protection,
 points to yet another form of inaction (Agamben, 1998). Similarly, the
 notion of refugee, people who, as victims of certain ethnic or political
 cleansing, live indefinitely in humanitarian camps, already contains our
 expectation that they would not act on their own. Their fate is either
 in the hands of diplomatic negotiators or at the mercy of their persecu
 tors. Here, action theory encounters its own exclusion, situations in
 which groups of people are reduced to nonactors.
 What we can conclude from the above discussion is that, using one
 of Lacan's sexuation formulas, all is socialized (thus structural) but the
 social is Non-All. Social structures are not just generative rules and
 resources that condition the infinite play of goals, identities, and relations.
 A social structural formation always contains an attempt to block the
 uncertainty and undecidability of its own field through inclusion and
 exclusion. From a theoretical viewpoint analogous to what the systems
 theorist calls second-order observer, conceiving structures as paradoxical,
 incomplete, and contingent symbolic formations opens up the possibility
 of addressing the issue of agency, socially transformational agency in
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 particular, as located in the gaps of structural formations and also as the
 struggle for hegemonizing the social.
 MOMENTS OF AGENCY
 If we adopt the Lacanian notion of the split subject and Laclau's for
 mulation of structures as paradoxical and contingent symbolic hegemonic
 formations, how do we proceed to examine agentic actions, more specifi
 cally, socially transformational actions? To address this question, I would
 like to start with an example: Stones's examination of Ibsen's A Doll's
 House (Stones, 2005:179-188), which, although providing a vigorous and
 sometimes insightful analysis, nonetheless fails at a crucial point. This
 analysis faithfully adheres to Giddens's framework of structuration, which
 turns out to be its strength and its weakness. First of all, Stones's analysis
 correctly identifies the external structural clusters such as economic rela
 tions (banking system in particular), legal institutions, and ideologies of
 family, love, patriarchy, and so forth, as the causal forces of the practices
 of the protagonists in their diegetic universe. Stones then moves to investi
 gate how the position-practice (structure and structuration) and disposi
 tional formulation and reformulation of the internal structures (actors)
 drive the narrative events to unfold. Toward the end of the analysis,
 addressing the most important event in the play, namely, Nora's exit,
 Stones writes:
 It is the reconfiguration and re-evaluation of her hierarchy of priorities that also
 allows leaving the "Doll's House" to become a "feasible option" for Nora. ...
 With the subversive, wrenching, realignment of her world-view, many of the causal
 forces that once had this irresistible power to influence her actions now no longer
 have the causal efficacy. She now feels it possible not to live in fear of Torvald's
 displeasure, of transgressing his patriarchal, constricting and pompous norms of
 propriety. (Stones, 2005:187)
 There is no doubt that Nora's world is reconfigured toward the end
 of the play, but to argue that Nora somehow conducts a r??valuation of
 "her hierarchy of priorities" and consequently finds leaving the doll's
 house a feasible option misses the point completely. Nora's act of leaving
 the doll's house has to be understood as an act of the impossible in the
 sense that the decision cannot be grounded in any rational calculation or
 evaluation. Already at the beginning of the long dialogue between Nora
 and Torvald in the last act, Nora points out: "You and father have done
 me a great wrong. It is your fault that my life has come to nothing." Is
 this not a way to say that I have come to the realization that I am noth
 ing of importance in your world since you are (always) ready to sacrifice
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 me when you have to save your honor? It can also be argued that this is
 the very moment that Nora, in choosing the two sides of the split-subject,
 which is fundamentally different from making choices within a structural
 context, chooses the side of the void that is the gap between symbolic
 identities and the position to choose, and her only option is to reject the
 symbolic definition of her being.
 Therefore, far from a calculated act, Nora's exit defies any causal
 chain embedded in the symbolic order of rationality. Ultimately, Nora is
 indifferent to the symbolic order, or the law. Her double transgression,
 forging her father's signature and forging her father's signature, already
 attests to her indifference. What collapses when her husband shows him
 self as an outraged but impotent coward is not the symbolic order but
 Torvald's love for her that is sustained by her fantasy, the Thing (object
 of a) in her that deserves his love. This fantasmic core of her being is what
 sustains her life in the doll's house, which stands for dull and trivial bour
 geois family life. It is clear that Nora's readiness to sacrifice her own life
 (suicide) for this fantasmic core (love) bears witness to her indifference to
 the symbolic order, a readiness for mutual cancellation to save the fantas
 mic core. Her final choice of leaving the house rather than committing sui
 cide points to the loss of the reason of self-sacrifice, the loss of her
 fantasmic kernel. This argument also points to the mistake in Stones's
 analysis when he states that Nora "now feels it possible not to live in fear
 of Torvald's displeasure, of transgressing his patriarchal, constricting and
 pompous norms of propriety" (quoted above). It is in retrospect that
 Nora finds life in the doll's house unbearable and Torvald's norms of pro
 priety constricting and pompous. Just a moment ago she was ready to sac
 rifice herself for this alleged unbearable life. The mistake of Stones's
 analysis can be attributed at least partially to his overly faithful adherence
 to the framework of structuration. What his analysis fails to recognize
 is precisely the split-void as the subject that defies and questions the
 (normative) social symbolic order. That said, the gestures of defiance and
 questioning per se are only one moment of agency, its efficacy?its realiza
 tion?needs to be registered in a (new) symbolic order.
 In her analysis of Rosa Parks's role in the civil rights movement,
 Lovell (2003) points out the possibility that Rosa Parks's refusal to yield
 her seat and her subsequent arrest may have ended up in the long silent
 list of similar incidents that had occurred previously. Nonetheless, Rosa
 Parks's heroic act did catalyze the ensuing social movement. Lovell perspi
 caciously recognizes the retroactive character of Parks's authority. A clo
 ser look at the sequence of events shows that Parks's act of refusal can be
 read as coinciding with Lacan's discourse of the hysteric (Nora's exit can
 also be understood as such a discursive gesture). In this discourse
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 Fig. 2. Lacan's discourse of the hysteric.
 (see Fig. 2), the split-subject questions the interpolation of the symbolic
 order (Lacan's notion of Master). The questioning can be formulated,
 following Lacan, as: "Why am I what you are saying that I am?" (Zizek,
 1998:79), which effectively "pushes the master?incarnated in a partner,
 teacher, or whomever?to the point where he or she can find the master's
 knowledge lacking" (Fink, 1995:134). Put differently, the hysteric returns
 her/his only internal split to the Master by exposing the Master's lacking.
 Precisely through insisting on the split-subject position, the actor's
 refusal is to be read as a rejection of a certain identity (and social duties
 thus imposed) instead of claiming a positive identity. At this moment,
 however, Parks's act presents itself as a possible candidate for socially
 transformational agencies that may or may not be recognized as such. In
 fact, Lovell draws our attention to the fact that cases similar to Parks
 were actually so numerous that it was expected (normative) that the driver
 in such situation "would stop and shout and then drive on" (Lovell,
 2003:8; quoting Young, 2000). Thus, Parks's act may well be "ignored"
 like the other cases without effecting the impacts as it did. Here, one
 should avoid any deterministic arguments that try to explain Parks's
 impacts on the civil rights movement as inevitable. Such explanations pre
 cisely diminish the agentic function of her act.
 How, then, should we understand the efficacy of Parks's act? The
 answer lies in a second moment at which her agency is recognized by
 means of another form of agency, the agency of the signifier (or signifying
 act). This second moment requires establishing another symbolic order
 with a new master signifier, that is to say, a Laclauan hegemony, a com
 peting discourse. In Parks's case, the new master signifier was established
 by the ensuing civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
 It is in a new symbolic order struggling or competing to hegemonize the
 social field, in this case, the civil rights movement's demand for justice
 and equality, that Parks's act was retroactively recognized as agentic, an
 actualized possibility. What should be further argued is that the actualized
 agency of Rosa Parks's was contingent; whereas it is inevitable that one
 of the cases similar to Parks would have been integrated in a competing
 symbolic structural order. These are the two moments of agency: first, as
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 possibility manifesting itself in contingent acts and, second, the agentic
 potentiality is only actualized (as necessity) through a retroactively estab
 lished discourse. Such a two-moment conception of agency rejects histori
 cist reduction of a significant social and political event to its historical and
 situational circumstances and by doing so opens a space for social trans
 formational agency.
 In the above case, the first moment is one at which the (racist seg
 regationist) symbolic structural order fails. In other words, it is brea
 ched by incidental personal acts. However, without a competing
 symbolic order to translate such breaches as failed struggles for justice
 and equality, the existing social order may simply handle such situa
 tions as minor disturbances, like how the many drivers managed similar
 situations. Parks's act may have lost in history as a failed attempt to
 defend one's right. The competing antisegregationist symbolic order
 started to take root precisely through translating Parks's failure into
 not only a victorious demonstration of courage but also the symbol of
 a long series of failed struggles. The parallel between the couple Parks
 King and Jesus-St. Paul is obvious. No wonder Zizek views St. Paul as
 the establisher of the master signifier in Christianity. What is crucial in
 the Pauline discursive gesture is to translate an unbearable failure (God's
 own death) into triumph. As Zizek indicates repeatedly, the installation
 of a master (signifier) does not change anything in positive reality: it
 changes everything (Zizek, 2005:125).
 CONCLUSION
 Agency conceived as ability and knowledge (or knowledgeability) of
 rules, norms, values, and possession of, or accessibility to, resources can
 be decomposed into structural components. What is knowledge if not
 some structural effect of socialization institutions? What are resources if
 not some stratified structural positions? To argue that such agency resides
 in the individual actor is an empty assertion of an abstract actor of no
 positive existence. Such assertions, which often lead to what Fuchs calls
 "heavy rhetoric" (Fuchs, 2001:29), result from the disavowed act of posit
 ing agency as a fantasmic object to fill in the structural gaps. It is in this
 sense that one can say: agency is the internal split of structure. As one
 gets closer to such conceptions of agency, agency disappears. In fact, con
 ceiving agency as the capacity to act in accordance with certain rules and
 to mobilize resources within structured situations always relies on certain
 notions of rationality. The above critique of Stones's analysis of Ibsen's
 A Doll's House shows that acts are sometimes not grounded in any
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 rationality, which by no means entails unintelligibility. In fact, it can be
 argued that Nora's act does not fit the definition of any form of (Weberi
 an) rationality. It is a pure ethical act in the Kantian sense. The efficacy
 of authentic social transformational agency consists in rejecting pre
 cisely the rationalities imposed and regulated by existing social structural
 formations.
 To avoid the dead-end of structural determinism and the various
 conflationist entanglements, two steps have been taken. First, the Laca
 nian split-subject is introduced to conceive the actor-agent as a two-sided
 subject that is the split between the inside and outside of a certain struc
 tural formation. This in turn requires a reformulation of the notion of
 structure. Thus, in a second step, Laclau's theory on hegemony is brought
 in to reconceptualize structures as inherently paradoxical social symbolic
 formations that always need to posit their own beyond through exclusion.
 This conception depicts structures as always partial and unstable, open to
 new formations. As a result, agency can be recognized in two moments
 conceived as two symbolic gestures. In the first, the subject-agent occupies
 its own void in questioning the Master (the big Other as a signifier for cer
 tain dominant symbolic order) and hystericizes the Master by means of
 which it returns the subject's lack-split back into the Master. In the sec
 ond moment, a founding gesture establishes a new social symbolic order
 that transforms a current struggle as manifestation and representation of
 all previously failed struggles.
 What is discernible in the arguments made above is their lineage with
 one of sociology's most important paradigms, namely, conflict theories,
 which, to a great extent, have been displaced into a multidimensional or
 even multiculturalist framework of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality,
 and more to come. The close and intricate entanglement of structure
 agency theories with the notion of social identity bears witness to efforts
 of translating conflicts into differences. The strength of the Laca
 nian/Zizekian and Laclauan perspectives, which is also what distinguishes
 these perspectives from traditional conflict framework, comes from their
 insistence on a certain fundamental antagonism, a hard kernel or the Lac
 anian real that only manifests as the gaps among social symbolic forma
 tions. Ultimately, it is this relocation of antagonism from positive
 differences into the negative that renders possible reformulations of struc
 ture and agency.
 REFERENCES
 Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stan
 ford University Press.
This content downloaded from 
            130.68.120.136 on Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:35:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Agency: The Internal Split of Structure 501
 Archer, Margaret S. 2000. Being Human: The Problem of Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press.
 Archer, Margaret S. 2003. Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge: Cam
 bridge University Press.
 Blumer, Herbert. 1968. "Society as Symbolic Interaction," In Arnold M. Rose (ed), Human
 Behavior and Social Processes: pp. 179-192. Boston: Houghton Mifflin (Orig. pub. 1962).
 Breslau, D 2000. "Sociology After Humanism: A Lesson from Contemporary Science Stud
 ies," Sociological Theory 18: 2: 289-307.
 Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Ann Mische. 1998. "What Is Agency? "American Journal of Sociol
 ogy 103: 4: 962-1023.
 Fink, Bruce. 1995. The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton, NJ:
 Princeton University Press.
 Fuchs, Stephen. 2001. "Beyond Agency," Sociological Theory 19: 1: 24-40.
 Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.
 Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
 Hays, Sharon. 1994. "Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture," Sociological
 Theory 12: 1: 57-72.
 Jones, Mark Peter. 1996. "Posthuman Agency: Between Theoretical Traditions," Sociological
 Theory 14: 3: 290-309.
 Lacan, J. 1998. Seminar XX: Encore, B. Fink (trans.), New York: W.W. Norton (Orig. pub.
 1972-1973).
 Lacan, J. 2006. ?crits: The First Complete Translation, B. Fink (trans.). New York: W.W.
 Norton (Orig. pub. 1970).
 Lacan, J. 2007. Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, R. Grigg (trans.). New
 York: W.W. Norton (Orig. pub. 1969-1970).
 Laclau, Ernesto. 1990. "The Impossibility of Society," In Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on
 the Revolution of Our Times. New York: Verso.
 Laclau, Ernesto. 1996. "Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter in Politics," In Ernesto Laclau,
 Emancipation(s). New York: Verso.
 Lovell, Terry. 2003. "Resisting with Authority: Historical Specificity, Agency, and the Per
 formative Self," Theory, Culture, & Society 20: 1: 1-17.
 Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
 Meyer, John W., and Ronald L. Jepperson. 2000. "The 'Actors' of Modern Society: The
 Cultural Construction of Social Agency," Sociological Theory 18: 1: 100-120.
 Pickering, Andrew. 1993. "The Mangle of Practice: Agency and Emergence in the Sociology
 of Science," American Journal of Sociology 99: 3: 559-589.
 Pickering, Andrew. 2000. "The Objects of Sociology: A Response to Breslau's 'Sociology
 After Humanism'," Sociological Theory 18: 2: 308-316.
 Ryan, Phil. 2000. "Structure, Agency, and the Nicaraguan Revolution," Theory and Society
 29: 2: 187-213.
 Sewell, William H. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,"
 American Journal of Sociology 98: 1: 1-29.
 Stones, Rob. 2005. Structuration Theory. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
 Tsushima, Teresa, and Peter J. Burke. 1999. "Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent
 Identity," Social Psychology Quarterly 62: 2: 173-189.
 Willis, Paul. 1977. Learning to Labor. New York: Columbia University Press.
 Wrong, D. H. 1961. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," Ameri
 can Sociological Review 26: 2: 183-193.
 Young, G. 2000. "She Would Not Be Moved," Guardian Weekend, December 16.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 1990. "Beyond Discourse Analysis," In Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the
 Revolution of Our Times: Appendix. New York: Verso.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 1991. For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor.
 New York: Verso.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 1993. Tarrying with the Negative. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
This content downloaded from 
            130.68.120.136 on Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:35:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 502  Wang
 Zizek, Slavoj. 1999. The Ticklish Subject. New York: Verso.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 2001. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? New York: Verso.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 2005. Interrogating the Real, Rex Butler and Scott Stephens (eds.). New York:
 Continuum.
 Zizek, Slavoj. 2006. The Parallax View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
This content downloaded from 
            130.68.120.136 on Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:35:49 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
